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The Gulf Studies Center is proud to begin publishing a series of interviews with 
international experts on the Gulf discussing various regional issues. The subject of this 
publication is the main challenges to be faced by the GCC economies and societies 
during the period of recovery from the negative impact of low oil prices and COVID-19 
pandemic. 
 
Introduction 
   
The GCC economies are being 
seriously hit by the negative impact of 
low oil prices and spread of Covid-19 
pandemic. The restrained inflow of oil 
incomes deepens the budget deficit of 
the countries and makes government 
spending cuts inevitable in 2020 and, 
most probably, 2021. As in the past, the 
first areas to suffer from these cuts are 
likely to be social programs, the private 
sector and jobs for expats. 
Subsequently, the fall in remittances 
from the Gulf region will cause an 
additional stress for the social security of 
the Middle Eastern countries that 
traditionally provide the GCC states with 
the bulk of its work force. At the same 
time, the non-oil sectors suffering from 
the Coronavirus pandemic are looking 
for additional support. Subsequently, the 
budgets of the GCC countries are 
overloaded with emergency spending 
allocated to fight the negative economic 
consequences of the Covid-19 outbreak 
to support their economies. The steps 
taken by the states are ranging from 
acute budget cuts, partial curfew and 
freezing of spending on ambitious 
projects to the provision of additional 
financial support to the banking sector 
and business. In financial terms, the 
extra burden of the GCC budgets is 
measured in, at least, $32bln for Saudi 
Arabia, $70bln for the UAE, $11.38bln 
for Bahrain, $16bln for Kuwait, $20.8bln 
for Oman, and $23.4bln for Qatar. And 
this bill keeps growing. The oil 
production cuts under the OPEC+ 
agreement signed in April, inevitable 
slowdown of the implementation of new 
oil projects  as well as the decrease in 
other economic activities will definitely 
lead to the contraction of the Gulf 
monarchies’ GDPs. According to the IMF 
estimates, Saudi Arabia's economy is 
expected to shrink by 2.3 percent, 
Qatar's by 2.3 percent, Kuwait's by 1.1 
percent, Oman's by 2.8 percent and 
Bahrain's by 3.6%.  
In the mid-term, the oil market is 
likely to regain its balance. Some experts 
even predict the beginning of supply 
deficit by 2024-25 inevitably pushing oil 
prices up. By that moment, the Covid-19 
pandemic might be over and the global 
economy will start its recovery. This 
period, however, might still be full of 
problems as well as opportunities for the 
GCC. In line with its main task to promote 
knowledge and awareness on the main 
socio-economic and political trends in 
the region, the GSC conducted the 
series of interviews with a selection of 
leading experts on the Gulf countries 
asking them how they see the main 
challenges for the GCC economies and 
societies during the process of recovery 
from the negative impact of the Covid-19 
pandemic and low oil prices? Their 
responses paint a very complex picture 
on what is to be done by the GCC in the 
coming years.    
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Labor Market and Demography as the 
Main Source of Concerns 
 
Dr. Hassan Hakimian, Professor of 
Economics, Director of the Middle 
Eastern Studies Department of the 
College of Humanities and Social 
Sciences (CHSS) at Hamad Bin Khalifa 
University (HBKU), Doha. 
 
The GCC States’ recent 
experience of shouldering two major 
crises simultaneously – one a public 
health crisis, another a huge collapse in 
oil prices – has raised questions over the 
popular belief that ‘lightning does not 
strike the same place twice’! 
Just as the region was coming to 
terms with the Covid-19 global pandemic 
and its far-reaching economic 
repercussions, calamity in the oil 
markets struck, pushing down oil prices 
to levels not seen for more than three 
decades.  Unlike the pandemic, 
however, the oil shock originated in the 
region itself with the Saudis flushing the 
market with large supplies of extra crude 
at a time when demand was heading 
south. Arguably, a hugely miscalculated 
step to secure market share, the 
immediate impact of this is already clear 
for the oil-exporting economies. Despite 
its initial healthy conditions, the GCC 
region is now potentially deprived of the 
vast resources it could draw from to deal 
with the headwinds it faces from the 
pandemic.  
The choice of appropriate policies 
in the GCC context reveals both 
similarities and contrasts with other 
countries. At the broad macro level, 
boosting aggregate demand and 
defending jobs is already reliant on a 
range of fiscal stimuli and monetary 
instruments, which these states have 
started to adopt to maintain both 
purchasing power and banking liquidity. 
Though their sizeable Sovereign Wealth 
Funds can assist the likely negative fiscal 
impacts of these measures, they cannot 
ignore the potential strains some of them 
might face if their pegged exchange rate 
to the US dollar comes under strain 
(more likely for smaller, less cash-rich 
countries like Oman and Bahrain).  
Another short-term challenge for 
countries so heavily dependent on 
imported material and day-to-day 
necessities is the management of the 
global supply chain at a time most 
countries are turning inwards and the 
obstacles to international trade are on 
the rise. But here too the GCC’s sizeable 
foreign currency reserves and stable 
currencies can provide a useful cushion. 
The real challenge, however, is 
likely to be at the micro level given the 
demographic and labour market 
structures of the GCC states, which are 
heavily reliant on imported labour. This is 
where the pandemic has made a 
disproportionate impact and is hardest to 
contain. In Qatar, for instance, official 
data indicate that 32% of all those who 
tested positive by late April were Indian, 
followed by 20% Nepalese and 18% 
Bangladeshis. According to the 
Economist magazine (23 April 2020), 
four-fifth of recently confirmed cases in 
Saudi Arabia were likely to be foreigners.  
Although some decisive steps 
have been taken to contain the 
pandemic’s further spread, it is ultimately 
the migrants’ living and working 
conditions that will determine healthy 
and reliable labour supplies for these 
economies in the future. A new and 
radical approach to the health and well-
being of these workers is a laudable goal 
in its own right. Although it might raise 
the short-term costs and slow down the 
economic growth tempo in the GCC 
states, it also makes business sense for 
long-term sustainability of a model of 
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development that relies heavily on large 
numbers of foreign workers.  
The global lockdown might after 
all be remembered not only for its large-
scale shutdowns but hopefully for the 
new doors it might help to open for a 
more inclusive and sustainable model of 
development in the GCC region. 
 
Painful Economic Decisions Needed 
 
Dr. Ahmed Mehdi, Research Associate 
at the Oxford Institute for Energy 
Studies, Oxford, the UK. 
 
Almost all GCC economies are 
weaker since the last oil crisis of 2014: 
public debt is higher, deficits are wider 
(driven by increased spending), and 
growth is slower (due to lower non-oil 
growth). 
While social distancing measures 
are likely to ease over the next several 
months (helping slowly restore oil 
demand), the path of global economic 
recovery remains highly uncertain. 
Similarly, despite OPEC+ cuts and a 
series of shut-ins, global inventories 
remain highly elevated – dynamics likely 
to anchor short-run prices in a range of 
$35-40/bbl.  For the GCC, the realities of 
a sub-$40/bbl world in the short-term is 
driving painful economic decisions. In 
Saudi Arabia, spending cuts of $13.4bn 
(2% of GDP) have been announced; 
liquidity injections have been unveiled 
and salaries in the private sector 
subsidised. While Saudi has been 
drawing on its liquid reserves, I do not 
see any major threat to the credibility of 
the exchange rate peg as the threshold 
level of reserves is around $300bn. This 
would require oil prices trading at around 
$30/bbl throughout next year – unlikely, 
in my view. 
In comparison, Qatar compares 
better with the GCC average (particularly 
debt-burdened Bahrain). Over the past 
few years, Qatar has moved beyond the 
peak of large capital outlays. Qatar has 
also accumulated significant savings at 
QIA of around $350bn – sufficient to 
weather the current crisis. Longer-term, 
Qatar’s economic fortunes will depend 
on medium-long term gas fundamentals. 
Covid-19 has now led to significant 
project deferrals on LNG projects. 
Despite the current weakness in gas 
prices, the crisis has left Qatar 
undeterred to push ahead with its 
massive North Field expansion, set to 
increase hydrocarbon revenues and 
expand Doha's geopolitical relevance, 
particularly as gas expands its role in the 
global energy system out to 2040. 
Despite this, the current crisis has 
highlighted the fiscal sustainability 
challenge of the GCC. With the IMF 
having recently estimated that the Gulf’s 
financial assets will be depleted by 2034, 
the crisis is likely to accelerate domestic 
reform attention (labour law reform and 
the sclerotic pace of non-oil growth) and 
wider issues within the oil and gas sector 
(rising cost of capital, investor 
uncertainty, and peak oil demand 
concerns).  
 
Growing Role of the State is Inevitable 
 
Dr. Karen Young, Resident Scholar at 
the American Enterprise Institute, 
Washington DC, the US 
 
Covid-19, combined with a very 
unsteady oil market, is creating an 
unprecedented disruption to the 
economic model of the GCC states. This 
disruption, however, will likely reinforce 
state-led recovery rather than shift 
towards more open economies or 
societies. Lower oil and gas revenues 
are putting pressure on governments to 
reduce spending. Meanwhile, local 
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demand destruction from lockdown and 
canceled government projects 
(everything from sports to Expo2020 to 
large gigaproject development) will 
disrupt the business cycle. As these are 
economies that depend on foreign 
workers to also be local consumers, the 
effects are severe. There will be job 
losses, expatriate exits and pressure on 
local banks to extend credit to firms and 
the public sector. Whatever momentum 
there was towards economic 
diversification will be difficult to resume, 
as state directed bailouts will favor first 
nationals and state-related entities. 
Capital flight, losses from government 
external holdings in global equity 
markets, unattractive environments for 
foreign investment, and mounting 
expenses in social welfare will all 
reinforce government dominance in Gulf 
economies. Right now, it will be survival 
strategies, rather than growth 
or innovation that will define Gulf 
societies and economies. 
 
Crisis as an Opportunity for 
Structural Transformations 
 
Dr. Naji Abi Aad, COO to Petroleb, 
Beirut, Lebanon 
 
Until very recently, to the average 
Gulf citizen, his/her nation’s economy 
seemed to be structured around 
exchanging oil and gas for cars and 
smart phones. The trouble now is that, as 
a result of the steep decline in demand 
mainly due to the Covid-19 aftermath, 
and of the resulting glut in supply, those 
fossil fuel products buy ever fewer 
imports and build fewer infrastructures 
as prices of oil and gas have plunged 
and their exports from the region is to 
further decrease. And the real problem is 
that oil and gas resources in the Gulf 
started to lose their strategic importance. 
One could well argue that 
petroleum revenues, as with proceeds 
from most commodities, are cyclical and 
sudden price drops, similar to the recent 
one, are not unusual. However, it would 
be a mistake for the Gulf nations to 
assume that prices are to rise again to 
previous high levels. The recent drop in 
prices is indeed indicative of an 
unprecedented structural change in the 
energy sector — one that is to have 
significant economic and political 
implications for the petroleum producing 
nations. 
This is why policymakers in the 
Gulf are recommended to take 
advantage of the current window of 
opportunity presented by low oil prices 
and budgets that have slipped into deficit 
in order to push through radical 
measures that would have been 
politically far more difficult during periods 
of plenty. 
Gulf governments are 
recommended to recognise that they do 
not longer have the luxury of the slow 
pace of incremental change that has 
characterised previous episodes of 
reform in the region, due to the urgency 
of the fiscal pressures that face their 
states. Such reforms are to be viewed as 
merely one step in a journey rather than 
in relation to any fixed start or endpoint 
and to have the confidence to persevere 
with sensitive measures and not be 
deterred by pushback from vested 
interests. 
Needless to say that Gulf 
governments are recommended to have 
the economic and political aspects of 
reform more closely linked as introducing 
of taxes and fees and cutting subsidies, 
however incremental, will inevitably 
change the relationship between the 
citizen and the state. 
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Balancing between East and West 
 
Dr. Sanam Vakil, Deputy Director and 
Senior Research Fellow at the Middle 
East and North Africa Programme of 
Chatham House, London, the UK. 
 
GCC economies are facing an 
unprecedented double shock from 
Covid-19 and the dramatic decline in oil 
prices.   While GCC governments have 
in general implemented timely and 
effective Covid-19 responses by 
enforcing quarantine measures 
alongside offering fiscal stimuli to protect 
the private sector and implementing 
spending cuts, the economic and fiscal 
challenges ahead will be further muddled 
by an increase in geopolitical tensions.  
Increasing friction between China and 
the United States demonstrated by the 
tit-for-tat barbs over Covid will also play 
out in the Middle East. US President 
Donald Trump is already stoking 
jingoism in what looks like another US-
led “you’re with us or against us” 
moment.   
Eager for China to resume its 
recovery and fearful that China might 
recalibrate its Belt and Road investments 
(BRI), GCC states have demonstrated 
solidarity with Beijing.  At the same time, 
China has used Covid diplomacy to 
improve its image by sending medical 
supplies to countries around the world.  
Despite Arab Gulf efforts at engaging 
China in regional tensions with Iran, 
Beijing has continued its policy of non-
intervention. Here, as friction with Iran 
continues alongside the Qatar crisis, 
conflict in Yemen, Libya and Syria, US 
security ties remain an important buffer 
for the Arab Gulf.  Caught between its 
Western oriented security relationship 
and its Eastern focused commercial one, 
avoiding such a choice and maintaining 
relations with both poles is essential for 
the GCC’s economic recovery and for 
sustaining security interests.   
 
Diversification Plans to be 
Reconsidered 
 
Dr. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Fellow for 
the Middle East at the Rice University’s 
Baker Institute for Public Policy, 
Houston, the US. 
 
A major challenge for GCC 
economies as they begin the process of 
recovery from Covid-19 will be the 
impact of the dislocation on the sectors 
that Gulf governments have prioritized 
as part of their efforts to diversify 
economies beyond oil and gas. The 
virtual standstill in international travel 
and the likelihood that recovery may take 
years will hit the investments made by 
Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Qatar in 
positioning themselves as regional hubs 
for air travel and for meetings and 
events. Dubai will be hit further by the 
falloff in tourist numbers and the delay to 
Expo 2020. In Saudi Arabia, the 
economic impact of Covid-19 and its 
aftermath will drive a stake through 
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s 
already-faltering Vision 2030 program of 
economic reform and his high-profile 
initiatives to boost domestic tourism and 
entertainment and construct the NEOM 
future city. With oil prices and revenues 
likely to remain suppressed – and well 
below budget breakeven prices (which 
themselves vary widely across the Gulf) 
– for some time to come, Covid-19 
provides an opportunity for governments 
in GCC states to call a halt to some of the 
more grandiose mega-projects and to 
reimagine diversification strategies to 
better fit the post-pandemic needs of the 
region. 
